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RECENT DECISIONS
Prejudgment Garnishment of Wages: A "Fair" Concept of Due
Process. In Sniadach v. Family Finance Corporation of Bay View,'
the Supreme Court of the United States held that Wisconsin's pre-
judgment garnishment procedure with respect to wages violates the
fundamental principles of due process of law under the Constitution
of the United States.
Under the Wisconsin statutory procedure, allowing garnishment
of wages before judgment, an alleged creditor was permitted to cause
the wages of an alleged debtor to be turned over to the court or to be
held by the employer pending the outcome of the principal action on the
debt.2  The creditor could invoke the procedure simply by alleging
that a debtor owed him a sum due under a contract,3 by paying to the
clerk of court a fee for the issuance of a summons,4 by serving the sum-
mons on the employer-garnishee, 5 and within ten days thereafter, serv-
ing the summons on the debtor.6 The validity of the garnishment could
not be tested until the principal action was tried.7 The defendant was
entitled to a subsistence allowance from his employer of $25 to $40
depending upon the number of his dependents, "But in no event in
excess of 50% of the wages or salary owing."s At the time Sniadach
was handed down, forty-one jurisdictions permitted some sort of pre-
judgment garnishment. 9 Of these, seventeen states, including Wiscon-
sin, permitted alleged creditors to deprive workers of their earnings
with neither a prior hearing nor the demonstration of some special
circumstances justifying the summary relief.'0
1395 U.S. 337 (1969).
2 Wis. STAT. §267.02(1) (1967). This statute has been amended to disallow
"any garnishment action affecting the earnings of the principal defendant prior
to judgment in the principal action." Earnings are defined in §267.01(5):
"'Earnings' means compensation paid or payable for personal services, wheth-
er denominated as wages, salary, commission, bonus or otherwise, and includesperiodic payments received pursuant to a pension or retirement program."
Wis. Laws ch. 127 (1969).
3 Wis STAT. §267.05(4) (1967).
4 WIs STAT. §267.04(1) (1967).
5 Id.
6 WIs. STAT. §267.07 (1967).
7 WIS. STAT. §267.16 (1967).
S Wis. STAT. §267.18(2) (1967).
9 Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 7, Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395
U.S. 337 (1969).
1l Id. In the other twenty-four jurisdictions, such garnishments are obtainable
only upon a showing by the plaintiff that without the garnishment, his chance
of collecting any judgment he might be awarded is small. In these jurisdictions,
a plaintiff seeking to garnishee a defendant's wages must show that defendant
is a non-resident, OHIO REv. CODE §2715.11, or that defendant has concealedhimself with intent to avoid service, N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-440.2-3, or that de-fendant has absconded, NEv. REv. STAT. §31.010, or that defendant has secretedhis property with intent to defraud, TENN. CODE ANN. §23-601, or that he has
no other property in the state, S. D. CODE §37.2802.
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In Sniadach, a finance company had issued a garnishment summons
against the employer-garnishee on the basis of the employee's alleged
default-on a promissory note for $420. Both the principal defendant
and the garnishee were served with the summons and a copy of the
complaint on the same day. The garnishee filed his answer, alleging
that he had in his possession the sum of $63.18 belonging to the prin-
cipal defendant, that he would pay one-half thereof as a subsistence
allowance to the defendant and retain the other half, pending fur-
ther instruction from the court. Thereafter, the defendant served on
plaintiff's counsel an order to show cause why the garnishment pro-
ceedings should not be dismissed for violation of Wisconsin constitu-
tional provisions and the United State Constitution, which secure due
process and equal protection under the law. Both the county court and
the circuit court upheld the constitutionality of prejudgment wage
garnishment. Their decisions were affirmed by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court which held that there was no deprivation of property involved in
garnisment proceedings. 1
The Wisconsin court relied on the leading case of McKay v. Mc-
Innes,1 2 where the United States Supreme Court held that an attach-
ment of real property prior to judgment merely resulted in the creation
of a temporary lien on the property. Under this reasoning, the defend-
ant was not deprived of his property because the attachment did not
destroy his title thereto. The United States Supreme Court further
stated that the attachment procedure and the subsequent litigation of
the principal action were not two distinct controversies but were a
part of one continuous process of adjudication. 3 In Byrd v. Rector,14
another case relied on by the Wisconsin court, the Court went on to
fully explain the McKay reasoning:
... the defendant is not deprived of his property by reason of
the levy of the copy of the attachment upon a person who is
indebted to him or who has effects belonging to the defendant.
The most that such procedure does is to deprive the defendant
of the possession of his property temporarily by establishing a
lien thereon. Whether the defendant shall be deprived of such
property must depend of course upon the plaintiff's subsequent
ability to obtain a judgment in personam or in rem on his claim
against the defendant. If, after having full opportunity to be
heard in defense of such claim, a judgment is rendered thereon
"Family Finance Corp. v. Sniadach, 37 Wis. 2d 163, 154 N.W.2d 259 (1967).
12 127 Me. 110, 141 A. 699 (1928), aff'd, (per curiam), 279 U.S. 820 (1928).
13 Id. at 116, 141 A. at 702.
'4 112 W.Va. 192, 163 S.E. (1932). An infant plaintiff who had been injured by
the explosion of a dynamite cap which had been negligently disposed of by
a nonresident defendant, commenced a suit in tort for his personal injury.
The attachment was executed by levying on personal property of the de-
fendant which was located in the county where the accident took place.
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against the defendant or his property, there has been no lack of
due process.15
In Ownbey v. Morgan,16 the Supreme Court upheld a foreign attach-
ment law which required a security bond to be deposited in court, equal
to the value of the property attached, before a defendant could even
appear and defend. This case was cited by the Wisconsin court for the
proposition that harsh results are of no consequence in determining
the constitutionality of the procedure.' 7 A strong regard for historical
precedent lent additional support in defense of the procedure:
The ability to place a lien upon a man's property, such as to
temporarily deprive him of its beneficial use, without any judicial
determination of probable cause dates back not only to medieval
England but also to Roman times .. .18 " (And) if a thing has
been practiced for two hundred years by common consent, it will
need a strong case for the Fourteenth Amendment to affect it
"1'9
Having determined that the general attachment procedure presents
no constitutional infirmity, the court reached the same conclusion as to
the garnishment of wages. The court seemed to indicate that the term
"creditor's remedy" is descriptive of a distinct legal concept which em-
braces, without categorical distinction, the remedies of attachment and
garnishment. It is only under this rationale that the ultimate conclusion
of the court seems to follow logically:
While neither Ownbey v. Morgan nor Coffin Brothers v. Bennet
involved garnishment before judgment statutes, their rationale,
when cited by the United States Supreme court as authority for
affirming Mclnnes v. McKay becomes clear. It is that the credi-
tor's remedies involved, though harsh, did not deprive a man of
his property without notice and an opportunity to be heard.
(emphasis supplied.) 20
Most jurisdictions, including Wisconsin, have held that attachment
and garnishment are essentially the same type of procedure 2 1 Both
procedures have the identical effect of creating a lien on the property
which has been subjected to their process. It is with this lack of dis-
15 Id. at 198, 163 S.E. at 848.
16 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
17 See note 20, infra.
is 37 Wis. 2d at 171, 154 N.W.2d at 264. This statement appears to say too much,
for the remedy was not generally a part of the common law. "The remedies
of attachment and garnishment were generally considered not to exist at
common law, although in some states the remedy of attachment was recog-
nized at common law as part of the service of process in a civil suit. The
remedies are of great antiquity and traces of them have been discovered in
the Roman Law and they were a recognized practice under the early customs
of the London Merchants." 6 Am. JuR.2d Attachment and Garnishment § 3
(1963). They are now regarded as only existing by virtue of statute. Id.
19 Id. at 171-72, 154 N.W.2d at 264.
20 Id. at 171, 154 N.W.2d at 264.
216 AM. JUR.2d Attachment and Garnishment § 3 (1963).
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tinction that the Wisconsin court reiterated the constitutional blessing of
the general attachment procedure and applied it to prejudgment gar-
nishment proceedings.
Justices Heffernan and Wilkie, in a dissenting opinion, felt that
the constitutionality of attachment proceedings generally, and wage
garnishment particularly, could not be determined as an all or nothing
proposition. The remedies are unique and their operation and effect
should be examined under the particular circumstances of each case
in order to determine if due process is satisfied. This necessarily en-
tails a consideration of the subject matter involved. In the instant case,
said the dissenters, the majority failed to consider the uniqueness of
wages and the fact that they represent a new and distinct property con-
cept .2 Stressing the requirement of reasonable notice, the dissenters
were inclined to uphold the procedure if the statute had specified a
definite time within which the principal action had to be brought. 3
A number of arguments attacking the garnishment procedure were
raised by the appellant but were not considered by the majority be-
cause of the defendant's lack of standing. Among these arguments
were: (1) that poor wage earners could have their wages garnisheed
on non-meritorious claims ;24 (2) that the statutory subsistence allow-
ance was inadequate ;25 (3) that the procedure whereby a bond might
secure the release of the garnisheed property unfairly prejudiced the
poor wage earner; 26  (4) that garnishment proceedings were the
cause of many discharges from employment; 27 and (5), that the
statutory procedure failed to give the debtor adequate notice.28 The
dissenting opinion indicated that the court might have been influenced
in refusing to consider these arguments by the fact that legislation de-
signed to abolish the remedy of prejudgment garnishment of wages was
pending 29 It is interesting to note that the decision of the United States
Supreme Court was hinged primarily on these arguments.
In contrast to the majority of the Wisconsin Court, the Supreme
Court of the United States placed a great deal of emphasis on the fact
that wages were the subject of the action. The Court's determination
that the proceeding as applied to wages is unconstitutional seems to be
2237 Wis. 2d at 181, 154 N.W.2d at 268.
23 Id. at 183, 154 N.W.2d at 270.
24 Id. at 167, 154 N.W.2d at 261. "Here, appellant's indebtedness is on a note,
and her affidavit in support of the order to show cause contains no allegation
that she is not indebted thereon to plaintiff."
25 Id.
26 Id. "Appellant has made no showing that she is a person of low income and
unable to post a bond."
27 Id. 154 N.W.2d at 262. "Appellant, however, has made no such showing that
her employer reacted in this manner."28 Id. at 168, 154 N.W.2d at 262. Inadequate notice is argued in that Wis. STAT.
§ 267.07(1) allows ten days time between service on the garnishee and the
debtor. "Here, appellant was served on the same day as the garnishee."
291d. at 185, 154 N.W.2d at 271.
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based on a sense of fairness to the poor wage earner. While disclaiming
any role as a "super legislative body," 30 the Court seemed to rely
heavily on legislative testimony.31 A recent study in four Wisconsin
cities concluded that "(g)arnishment is used not only to secure pay-
ment of sums legitimately due, but also to force alleged debtors to pay
without contesting the debts in court." 32 Garnishment and the resulting
loss of employment apparently are a major cause of bankruptcies in
the United States. 33 "Apart from those collateral consequences, it ap-
pears that in Wisconsin the statutory exemption granted the wage earner
is 'generally insufficient to support the debtor for any one week.' -34 The
result, concludes the Court, is that the poor wage earner is so unduly
prejudiced by such a procedure that judicial relief is properly available
under the Fourteenth Amendment:
Where the taking of one's property is so obvious, it needs no
extended argument to conclude that absent notice and a prior
hearing (cf. Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U.S. 413,
423) this prejudgment garnishment procedure violates the fund-
amental principles of due process.35
Mr. Justice Harlan based his concurring opinion on a less sociologi-
cal and more legalistic analysis of the case. Stating that due process
requires "notice and an opportunity to be heard" before one is deprived
of property or the unrestricted use thereof, he recognized that special
justification may, in certain circumstances, allow for less than a literal
interpretation of this language.36 And the "fundamental fairness" of
the situation is a proper subject for consideration in determining wheth-
er or not such justification exists.37 Here, however, he felt that there
was no reason to deprive the defendant of her wages before a determi-
nation of the validity or probable validity of the claim.38
Mr. Justice Black, on the other hand, felt that the majority was de-
ciding a question of pure policy and was thereby usurping a state legis-
lative function. 69 Furthermore, he said, "fundamental fairness" is not
a proper basis on which to decide the constitutionality of an established
legal procedure because the term defines no boundaries of interpreta-
tion.40 The effect of the "fundamental fairness" test would be to leave
30 395 U.S. at 339.
31 Id. at 34041.
32 Petitioner's Brief, supra note 9 at 8-9.
331d. at 11 n. 5.
34395 U.S. at 341.
35 Id. at 342.
361d. at 343.
37 Id. at 342.
38 Id. at 343.
39 Id. at 345.
40 Id. at 350-51.
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the interpretation of law to the unrestricted opinions of individual
judges.4'
The failure of the majority of the United States Supreme Court
to define the basis of its holding in a clear legal analysis generates a
number of unanswered questions: Must all prejudgment procedures
be reexamined for a determination of whether or not they are "funda-
mentally fair ?" Are all legal actions which directly or indirectly affect
wages before judgment constitutionally unfair? Or is the rule in
Sniadach only applicable to the prejudgment garnishment of wages?
A recent decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court interpreted
Sniadach as totally abolishing the remedy of prejudgment garnishment.
In Larson v. Fetherston,42 where corporate accounts receivable were
the subject of the procedure, the court declared:
Although the majority opinion in Sniadach makes reference to
the hardship of the unconstitutional procedure upon the wage
earner, we think that no valid distinction can be made between
garnishment of wages and that of other property. Clearly, a
due process violation should not depend upon the type of prop-
erty being subjected to the procedure. 43
This interpretation necessarily generates an inquiry into the validity
of related types of prejudgment procedures.
Attachment is a remedy whereby persons or property are taken
into legal custody for the purpose of bringing a person before the court,
of acquiring jurisdiction over the property seized, of furnishing security
for debts or costs, or of arresting a fund in the hands of a third person
who may become liable to pay it over.44 Theoretically, the only differ-
ence between garnishment and attachment is that in the former, proper-
ty of the alleged debtor is taken into legal custody from the possession
of a third person, whereas in the latter, property is taken directly from
the possession of the alleged debtor.45 It is unrealistic, however, to sug-
gest that a violation of due process can depend on such a technical
distinction. Furthermore, the Wisconsin court has held that the proce-
dures are to be considered identical.46 Does it follow that prejudgment
attachment is also unconstitutional? Or does the requirement that cer-
tain justification be alleged before the attachment procedure can be
invoked save prejudgment attachment from unconstitutionality ?4
411d.
4244 Wis. 2d 712, 172 N.W.2d 20 (1969).
43Id. at 718, 172 N.W.2d at 23.44 BLAcK's LAW DicrIoNARY 161 (4th ed. 1968).
45 6 Am. JUR.2d Attachment and Garnishment § 3 (1963).46Id. Cf. LaCrosse National Bank v. Wilson, 74 Wis. 391, 43 N.W. 153 (1889);
Bragg v. Gaynor, 85 Wis. 468, 55 N.W. 919 (1893).
4 Wis. Stat. § 266.03 (1967), sets forth the justification needed to be alleged
before the remedy of attachment may be invoked:
"(1) ON CoNTRAcr OR JUDGMENT. Before any writ of attachment shall
be executed the plaintiff or some one in his behalf shall make and annex
19701
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Besides attachment, the availability of a number of other prejudg-
ment procedures may be in jeopardy. Replevin involves an action to
recover property which is unlawfully detained and allows the imme-
diate repossession of the property by the plaintiff at the commencement
of the action.48 The Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act allows a
creditor to set aside a conveyance against an alleged fraudulent grantor
or grantee before the claim is reduced to judgment.4  A lis pendens
proceeding creates a lien on real estate before a judicial determination
of the merits of the claim.50 A construction lien,51 a mechanic's lien, 5-
and an innkeeper's lien5 3 may all be effected prior to a judicial deter-
mination of the indebtedness which is necessary to create these liens.
thereto an affidavit stating that the defendant is indebted to the plaintiff
in a sum exceeding fifty dollars specifying the amount above all set-offs,
and that the same is due upon contract or upon a judgment and that the
affiant knows or has good reason to believe either:
"(a) That the defendant is absent from this state, or is concealed there-
in so that summons cannot be served on him; or
(b) That the defendant has disposed of or concealed or is about to
dispose of or conceal his property or some part thereof with intent to
defraud his creditors; or
(c) That the defendant has removed or is about to remove property
out of this state with intent to defraud his creditors; or
(d) That the defendant fraudulently incurred the obligation respecting
which the action is brought; or(e) That the defendant is not a resident of this state; or
(f) That the defendant is a foreign corporation; or if domestic that
no officer or agent thereof on whom to serve the summons exists or re-
sides in this state or can be found; or
(g) That the action is against a defendant as principal on an official
bond to recover money due the state or to some county or other munici-
pality therein, or that the action is against the defendant as principal upon
a bond or other instrument given as evidence of debt for or to secure
the payment of money embezzled or misappropriated by such defendant
as an officer of the state or of a county or municipality therein."
48 WIs. STAT. ch. 265 (1967). The action applies only to wrongfully detained
property and requires an affidavit of the plaintiff that he is entitled to the
possession of the property claimed in the principal action. Upon requisition
to the sheriff, supported by a bond, the sheriff may take and retain the property
from the possession of the defendant. The classical grounds of attachment
need not be present.
49 WIS. STAT. § 242.09 provides that:
"(1) Where a conveyance or obligation is fraudulent as to a creditor,
such creditor, when his claim has matured, may, as against any person
except a purchaser for fair consideration without knowledge of the fraud
at the time of the purchase, or one who has derived title immediately or
mediately from such a purchaser,
(a) Have the conveyance set aside or obligation annulled to the extent
necessary to satisfy his claim, or
(b) Disregard the conveyance and attach or levy execution upon the
property conveyed .. "
WIS. STAT. § 242.10 provides for similar relief when the claim has not yet
matured.
50 Wis. STAT. § 281.03 (1967).
51 WIs. STAT. § 289.01 (1967).
52 WIs. STAT. § 289.41 (1967).
.3 WIs. STAT. § 289.43 (1967). It should be noted that California's Innkeeper's
Lien Law was recently held unconstitutional by the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California. The court's decision was based
on Sniadach. Klim v. Jones, 39 U.S.L.W. 2060 (August 4, 1970).
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Might these remedies also constitute a violation of due process under
the rationale of Sniadach and Fetherston?
Any unqualified extension of Sniadach to all prejudgment proce-
dures seems to be incompatible with the following language contained
in the opinion:
Such a summary procedure may well meet the requirements of
due process in extraordinary situations .... 4 A procedural rule
that may satisfy due process for attachments in general, . ..
does not necessarily satisfy procedural due process in every case.55
It is apparent from the foregoing language that the Court in Sniadach
did not intend to upset the attachment procedure in general; rather,
it limited its denouncement explicitly to the situation where wages are
the subject matter of the garnishment.
On the other hand, the United States Supreme Court does seem
to place great significance on the fact that prejudgment garnishment of
wages might deprive a wage earner of the necessities of life: "It is a
most inhuman doctrine. It compels the wage earner, trying to keep
his family together, to be driven below the poverty level."5' Are all
legal procedures which effectively result in a prejudgment deprivation
of wages subject to the same attack of being constitutionally unfair? Is
the Supreme Court, in deference to the less affluent, creating a new
property concept to which all legal proceedings must pay heed?
In attempting to resolve these questions, two preliminary considera-
tions must be entertained. First, if the purpose of the Court's ruling
that wages are exempt from prejudgment seizure is to allow an alleged
debtor to maintain a minimum standard of living, then all forms of
remuneration which are depended upon for the necessities of life should
be included in the Supreme Court's definition of "wages." It would be
erroneous to draw the technical distinctions between "wages", "earn-
ings" and other "income" under this rationale.57 Secondly, if in fact a
new class of property was created, its constitutional protection should
54395 U.S. at 339.
5 Id. at 340.5c Id.
57 "Wages" have been defined as: "Every form of remuneration payable for a
given period to an individual for personal services, including salaries, com-
missions, vacation pay, dismissal wages, bonuses and reasonable value of
board, rent, housing, lodging, payments in kind, tips and any other similar
advantage received from the individual's employer or directly with respect
to work for him." Ernst v. Industrial Commission 246 Wis. 205, 16 N.W.2d
867 (1944). "Earnings" have been defined as: "The gains of a person derived
from his services or labor without the aid of capital." Brown v. Hebard, 20
Wis. 330 (1866). It would appear that, under these definitions, "wages" are
limited to the situation where an individual is employed by another, whereas
"earnings," in addition to including "wages," would include returns of self-
employment. Thus, "income" would include "wages," "earnings," and returns
on capital investments. It is conceivable that many persons obtain money
solely from "income." Does the Wisconsin statutory amendment discriminate
against these persons? See note 2 supra.
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be available against an indirect as well as a direct taking of that property.
A legal procedure which effects a direct deprivation of wages is in
consequence no different from a legal procedure which deprives a per-
son of the opportunity to acquire those wages. It is a maxim of the law
that "one cannot do indirectly which the law forbids him to do directly."
The legal process may be invoked in numerous instances which
might result in an individual being effectively deprived of necessary
income. Discovery proceedings which compel a possible party defend-
ant to testify in an adverse examination may deprive that party of wages
as a result of the time lost from employment.5 s Must compensation be
given for the time required for such an examination? Under the Uni-
form Commercial Code, a secured party may, on default, take posses-
sion of the debtor's collateral and foreclose without judicial proceed-
ings if done in a commercially reasonable manner. 9 If such collateral
is income producing, is not the debtor being deprived of the income
before it has been judicially determined that he was in default? Simi-
larly, a receiver may be appointed in a mortgage foreclosure action
to preserve the rents and profits accruing from the property during the
pendency of the action.60 Is not the debtor being deprived of the rents
and profits before it has been judicially determined that he was in de-
fault? If Sniadach is construed as creating and protecting a new class
of property, are not these proceedings subject to a constitutional re-
examination?
CONCLUSION
The confusion generated by the Sniadach decision which may re-
sult in an attempt to disrupt all prejudgment procedures or to treat
wages as a separate class of property in all cases, is a product of the
Court's failure to examine fully the issue: deprivation of property
without due process of law.
The leading authority on this issue is Mullane v. Central Hannover
Trust Company.61 That case concerned the kind of notice required that
would reasonably and timely apprise interested parties of their rights
58 Wis. STAT. § 887.12(6) (1967).
59 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-503 provides that: "Unless otherwise agreed
a secured party has on default the right to take possession of the collateral.
In taking possession a secured party may proceed without judicial process
if this can be done without breach of the peace or may proceed by action. If
the security agreement so provides the secured party may require the debtor
to assemble the collateral and make it available to the secured party at a
place to be designated by the secured party which is reasonably convenient
to both parties. Without a removal a secured party may render equipment
unusable, and may dispose of collateral on the debtor's premises under Section
9-504."
60WIs. STAT. § 268.16(1) (1967), provides for the appointment of a receiver:
"On the application of either party, when he establishes an apparent right to
or interest in property which is the subject of the action and which is in the
possession of an adverse party, and the property or its rents and profits are
in danger of being lost or materially impaired."
61339 U.S. 306 (1950).
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in property before they could be deprived of that property by adjudica-
tion. The Court succinctly stated the minimum requirements of due
process:
... deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication must
be preceded by notice and an opportunity for hearing appropriate
to the nature of the case.62 (emphasis supplied).
In a garnishment before judgment situation, notice and opportunity
for hearing is afforded at best contemporaneously with the deprivation
of property. It is a legal fiction to suppose that a person is not in
some way "deprived" of property which is garnisheed before judgment.
It-cannot be realistically asserted that Mrs. Sniadach was not deprived
of her wages while they were being held by her employer. Due process
in that case, then, required that she be given "appropriate" notice and
opportunity for hearing. The Court in Mullane gives some indication
of what is meant by "appropriate":
A construction of the Due Process Clause which would place
impossible or impractical obstacles in the way could not be
justified.6 3
"The criterion is not the possibility of conceivable injury but
the just and reasonable character of the requirements, having
reference to the subject with which the statute deals." 4
Thus, the Mullane decision provides some guidelines for developing
a workable formula for determining the constitutionality of any pre-
judgment procedure. The reasonable character of the particular pro-
cedure is found by balancing the necessity of the action on the part
of the plaintiff against the inconvenience and prejudice suffered thereby
on the part of the defendant. And the nature of the property involved
is only relevant insofar as it adds a substantial prejudice to either party.
In Sniadach there was no real necessity of garnisheeing the debtor's
wages before the trial of the principal action: the property was not
unique from the standpoint of the plaintiff; personal jurisdiction was
readily available as the debtor was a resident of the state of Wisconsin;
there was no allegation that the debtor was about to abscond from the
jurisdiction or about to conceal her property in an effort to defraud
creditors; and there was no agreement between the parties that garnish-
ment would result from a default. Furthermore, there was no statutory
requirement that grounds of necessity be alleged. Balanced against this
lack of necessity was the substantial prejudice suffered by the defend-
ant under a statutory procedure which allowed the plaintiff to deprive
her of 50% or more of her wages.
621d. at 313.
63 Id. at 313-14.
64 Id. at 315.
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In conclusion, it seems apparent that application of the rule of
Sniadach may not be strictly limited to garnishment or to wages. For
example, the rule of Sniadach could be utilized to condemn the attach-
ment of such things as household goods, automobiles and other chattels
where an argument of necessity could be made.65 While the scope of
the Sniadach rule remains unclear, what is quite clear is that the threat
of constitutional attack has cast shadows on legal proceedings, the
validity of which, prior to Sniadach, had scarcely been questioned.
RICHARD D. D'ESTRADA
65 Such a rationale was recently adopted by the United States District Court for
the Northern District of New York (three judge court). In holding uncon-
stitutional a New York statute which permitted the prejudgment seizure upon
default of payment for chattels bought on conditional sale, the court made
the following reference to Sniadach:
Beds, stoves, mattresses, dishes, tables and other necessities for ordi-
nary day-to-day living are, like wages in Sniadach, a "specialized type
of property presenting distinct problems in our economic system," the
taking of which on the unilateral command of an adverse party "may
impose tremendous hardships" on purchasers of these essentials. That it
is a temporary taking, does not obviate the objection that it is a taking
prior to hearing and notice....
Lack of refrigeration, cooking facilities and beds create hardships, it
would seem, equally as severe as the temporary withholding of one half
of Sniadach's pay, and measured by Sniadach, the hardships imposed
cannot be considered de minimus....
Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., Inc., 39 U.S.L.W. 2082 (July 29, 1970).
[Vol. 53
